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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from detruction by Communism, there is vital need to salvage consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights from annihilation by these same efforts.
Both courts and legislatures should re-examine the Communist threat
and should then determine whether recent laws do themselves present
more of a threat to our freedom than does subversion.
JUDICIAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE
FORFEITURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
THROUGH EXPANSION OF THE CONDITIONED
PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adler v. Board of Education of
the City of New York, declared: "I have not been able to accept the
recent doctrine that a citizen who enters the public service can be forced
to sacrifice his civil rights. I cannot for example find in our constitutional
scheme the power of the state to place its employees in the category of
second class citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expres-
sion."' It is both surprising and noteworthy that Mr. Justice Douglas
regarded as recent doctrine the prerequisite that one forego the exercise
of constitutional rights before becoming eligible for participation in a
governmental activity or benefit, for this stipulation has received judicial
approval for nearly a century. 2 At first glance, such an exaction by the
. . . Only those lacking responsible humility will have a confident solution for prob-
lems as intractable as the frictions attributable to differences of race, color or religion.
This being so, it would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a
choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some
explicit limitation on the State's power. That the legislative remedy might not in
practice mitigate the evil, or might itself raise new problems, would only manifest once
more the paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent
in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues. . . ." Id. at 261-262.
Yet in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), Mr. Justice Rutledge warned
that "... any attempt to restrict those [First Amendment] liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed,
which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds,
will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. ... See Frank, The United
States Supreme Court: 1951-1952, 20 U. OF Cml. L. REv. 1, 24-29 (1952).
If state subversion legislation cannot be condemned as "unreasonable" or "without
rational basis," then many of these laws will stand. State statutes which impose those
severe regulations heretofore discussed may well be declared constitutional though the
rights of speech, press, and assembly and the sanctity of the belief must be sacrificed
by such a determination. The price of combating Communism and subversion by this
method is too great; liberty at so large a sacrifice is not liberty at all.
1. 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952).
2. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); United Public Workers
NOTES
government appears to be unusual but closer examination of techniques
currently utilized in dealing with unpopular minority groups reveals that
such requirements are rapidly becoming the modus operandi.3
Today, communism represents a threat to freedom, and, conse-
quently, communists, left-wingers, and fellow-travelers are undesirable
groups. Given the distasteful ideas and causes, the paramount concern
becomes the selection of appropriate methods for discovering those who
believe and espouse them.
The government has sought to protect itself and its citizens from
the evils inherent in communism by making the advocacy of overthrow
of the government a crime. The techniques and procedures employed to
achieve this goal are as lucid and definite as the motivation itself, for
when it is a crime to advocate overthrow of the government, or to be a
communist, the individual accused of violating the law receives the full
protection of the criminal process. Intent is usually a prerequisite to
conviction4 and proof of violation must be made within the'safeguards
furnished by evidentiary rules. Since there is a presumption of innocence
in criminal cases, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused advocates forceful overthrow or is a communist. Should
the accused be convicted, his punishment may be a fine or imprisonment
or both. Although the federal government5 and most states6 have made
the advocacy of violent overthrow of the government a crime, relatively
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) ; Ex parte Gar-
land, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867); McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) ; Ex parte Hunter, 2 W.Va. 122 (1867).
3. Throughout history, instances can be found of the subjection of unpopular
groups to persecution of various kinds and degrees because they supposedly constitute
a threat of some sort to the majority of their contemporaries A cursory glance at the
plight of the Christians under Roman rule, the oppression and annihilation of the Jeiv
under Nazis:n, the infamous inquisition in Spain, and the discriminatory treatment
inflicted upcn the founders of this nation by the tyrannical policies of George II should
suffice to illustrate the universal nature of this persecution. Many so-called threats are
illusory and momentary at best; many are substantial and continual. A generation
faced with such a menace should determine which of the two types it is before affirma-
tive action is taken; however, the very persons who must make this determination are
many times so intimately concerned with the problem that their sense of reason becomes
clouded so as to hide from them the real factual danger that the menace presents. See
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES c. 2 (1941). Later generations looking
at the issues in retrospect often come to the scholarly conclusion that their ancestors
were overwhelmed by unfounded fear and reacted, as frightened people do, by taking
the most drastic measures to obviate the threat.
4. Indiana has a statute making it a felony to be a member of the Communist
Party. On the face of it, no intent or knowledge of the purpose of the party is neces-
sary for conviction. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-5204 (Burns Supp. 1951).
5. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952).
6. For a compilation of these statutes as of January 1, 1951, see GELLHORN, THE
STATES AND SuBvERsIoN, App. A (1952).
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few individual members of the Communist Party have been prosecuted
and convicted under these laws.
The sovereign's fear of possible communist infiltration into positions
of responsibility in government where such forces could seriously under-
mine the efficient operation of the governmental machinery and cause
irreparable damage to the nation has led to the institution of the security
and loyalty programs. The government's purpose which gave birth to
these programs is manifest; however, the techniques utilized to affect
the desired result are founded upon indefinite standards and vague pro-
cedures for ascertaining the dangerous groups which are to be excluded
from governmental employ. To implement the federal government's
security and loyalty programs, federal agencies are required to institute
an investigation of each applicant and present employee of the agency
in an effort to ascertain the status of his loyalty.7 The limited procedural
safeguards which exist in this area arise out of governmental policies
adopted under these programs. If, during the investigative process, there
should appear indications that the employment of the particular individual
is not "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security," the
agency head may suspend the individual." Following such an investiga-
tion and review as the agency head deems appropriate, the accused's
employment shall be terminated if such action is in the "interest of
the national security."9 The order does not indicate that the accused has
any right to a hearing, to counsel, to present evidence in his own behalf,
to know the specific evidence against him, or to know or confront his
accusers.
Loyalty oaths and affidavits afford the most flexible means for
dealing with unpopular groups. It is in this area that both the purpose
for the restriction and the implementation become obscure and confusing.
The interest the government is trying to protect is not always clear, and
the techniques employed are many times uncertain and disorderly. No
procedural safeguards exist; the state must prove nothing. The individual
must determine whether or not he advocates or believes certain ideas,
which may be quite vaguely defined and considerably inclusive, and
whether or not he belongs, or has belonged, to an organization which
endorses or teaches certain philosophies. The theory underlying this
technique is that the individuals at whom the oath requirement is aimed
will refuse to take it. If this basic premise is correct, an unpopular and
possibly dangerous person will be penalized by deprivation of the govern-
7. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FED. REG. 2489 (1953).
8. Id. at 2491.
9. Ibid.
NOTES
i
ment benefit which is conditioned upon the taking of the oath. If he is
candid and admits that he advocates overthrow of the government by
unlawful means, he is not only denied the advantage he seeks, but he
may be subject to prosecution under the criminal statutes. Should the
individual take the oath he may, thus, avail himself of the proffered
service or employment; if, in so doing, he has lied about his beliefs or
the groups with which he associates, he may be prosecuted for perjury.
Manifestly, the procedures and sanctions coincident with each
method invoked by the sovereign to regulate unwanted groups are
dissimilar. The procedural requirements are obviously less demanding
with each step away from criminal statutes; seemingly the procedural
safeguards become less exacting as the penalty for infraction becomes
less stringent. Under certain circumstances, however, the denial of par-
ticular governmental services or employment may be as, or more, serious
and restrictive a penalty than imprisonment or a fine for the exercise
of an activity which may be constitutionally guaranteed. 10
The most widely used weapon against unpopular groups is a loyalty
oath requirement which conditions the grant of a governmental benefit.
Perhaps the dominant reason for use of this alternative is the ease with
which restrictions may be imposed upon the undesirable person. This
very facility, however, makes the choice potentially dangerous, for a lack
of substantive and procedural safeguards for the protection of individual
liberties uniquely lends itself to a process whereby basic freedoms may be
substantially undermined. Moreover, this technique permits wide latitude
for determining who is unpopular or dangerous. Therefore, any practice
which seeks to place disabilities upon unacceptable segments of society
by utilizing a method wherein little protection is afforded individual
rights should be closely scrutinized and evaluated in order that funda-
mental freedoms may not be arbitrarily and summarily denied.
The limitation upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms
resulting from the use of the above method is obvious and this has led
to the application of the term "unconstitutional condition" to the loyalty
oath or affidavit requirement as a prerequisite to a government privi-
lege." The sovereign need only select some existing or contemplated
governmental activity and then deny its advantages to anyone who does
10. See pp. 526-32 infra.
11. The term unconstitutional condition may be a misnomer in that it signifies a
conclusion of the writer and not of the courts. The greater majority of the conditions
which have been imposed upon governmental privileges have been held constitutional
when tested in the courts. The phrase "unconstitutional condition," however, will be
used in this note to designate any stipulation imposed upon the grant of a govern-
mental privilege which in effect requires the recipient of the privilege to relinquish
some constitutional right.
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not believe, speak, or act in conformance with the prevailing beliefs
of the majority. Thus, the government may effectively penalize the
individuals for whom the proscription is intended; the sanction is either
denial of the benefits to be gained from participation in the governmental
activity, or deprivation of basic constitutional rights. In the first instance,
what may be an economic, social, or personal necessity is withheld
because one cannot or will not comply with the conditions attached to
its grant. In the second instance, freedoms regarded as essential to
societal and individual well-being are summarily removed. That is, in
order to avail himself of the benefits proffered by the government, the
individual must forego the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Mr. Justice Douglas' comment in the Adler case,12 however, exemplifies
how unknown and misunderstood the applications and limits of this
doctrine have been in American law.
Apparently Mr. Justice Douglas considered that the unconstitutional
condition in relation to government employees was first conceived in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell in 1947.13 The principle, however,
was not new in 1892 when then Judge Holmes offered his oft-quoted
dictum: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."'1 4 Since the city
was not obligated to hire the plaintiff as a policeman, his employment in
that capacity was a gratuitous act upon which the city could "impose
any reasonable condition."' 5 Holmes' rationale became the foundation
of judicial decisions upholding conditions levied on government privileges
and was instrumental in creating and continuing the use of the words
"right," "condition," and "privilege" in decisions concerning government
employment and in other areas as well.
Writers have maintained that the unconstitutional condition found
its greatest applicability where states denied entry to a foreign corpora-
tion except upon the corporation's acceptance of certain conditions.' 6
Admission of corporate enterprise into a state was a privilege which
could be completely withheld under the authority of Paul v. Virginia;17
therefore, it seemed logical that the greater power of exclusion included
the lesser power of condition.' s
12. See p. 520 supra.
13. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
14. McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.F
517 (1892).
15. Ibid.
16. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COL. L. REv.
321 (1935) ; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 879 (1929).
17. 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1869).
18. "It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that . . . the state, having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit
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Mr. Justice Sutherland presented what appeared to be a sensible,
workable solution to the conditioned privilege problem in Frost v. R.R.
Commissioners of California."9 Recognizing that the privilege of using
the public highways was vital to the petitioner's commercial existence,
Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that the state could not impose condi-
tions upon the grant of this privilege which would necessitate the sur-
render of the petitioner's constitutional rights.20 If constitutional rights
can be bartered away as the price to be paid for the enjoyment of a
state granted privilege, then all constitutional guarantees might be de-
stroyed by an indirect process, outwardly voluntary, which is, in reality.
compulsory and fraught with coercion. 21 This opinion completely refutes
the theory that since a corporation has no right, merely a privilege, to
even enter a state, it cannot complain about conditions exacted from it
in return for any other state granted privilege it seeks. Thus, by
looking to the effect of the condition, rather than to the activity condi-
tioned, the Frost case ended the use of the unconstitutional condition
in the corporation area.22
The demise of the unconstitutional condition in the corporation
field, however, did not result in terminating the use of the same reasoning
in other areas. The courts, faced with laws requiring the surrender of
constitutional rights in connection with other activities, have borrowed
phrases and reasoning from the cases dealing with state control of corpo-
to impose." Frost v. R.R. Commissioners of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
See Western Union Telegraph v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910)
(dissent). See also Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 252
(1906) ; Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1877). Contra: Terral
v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922).
19. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
20. Id. at 593-94.
21. Id. at 593.
22. Perhaps the unconstitutional condition would have been permanently abandoned
in all areas, or at least severely contained after the Frost case, were it not for the
courts' changing interpretation of the commerce clause power. Today, any act of a
state legislature which burdens interstate commerce is unconstitutional, and the authority
of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1869), permitting a state to prohibit a cor-
poration from coming into the state is no longer valid. E.g., Dean Milk Company v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Since the basic premise upon which the courts upheld the state's power to con-
dition the entry of a corporation into the state was that the state could completely
deny such entry, the destruction of the premise effectivly destroys the conclusion. Be-
cause the commerce power intervened in this area, the destruction of the unconstitutional
condition as to the corporation could be distinguished from other areas where the
authority to completely withhold a privilege was, as yet, unquestioned. Unfortunately,
the Frost decision and the courts' changing interpretation of the commerce clause
followed too closely to permit the rationale of Sutherland's opinion to become recog-
nized as pertinent to all unconstitutional conditions in whatever form they might be
found.
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rations and have transplanted them to contemporary decisions involving
numerous and diversified subjects.
Perhaps the most frequent use of the principle has been in cases
relating to government employment. It has become a common practice
for states to require applicants for jobs to sign an affidavit that they
do not now23 and, in some instances, never did advocate24 or belong to
an organization which advocates forceful overthrow of the government. 25
Admittedly, such speech may be a crime under the various sedition,
criminal anarchy, and criminal syndicalism acts ;26 therefore, it may be
argued that no one has a constitutional right to engage in it. Further,
if an individual can be imprisoned for participating in certain activities,
deprivation of a privilege for such participation seemingly should be
valid. Those who would defend such a position may even contend that
the latter sanction benefits the individual because it is more lenient than
the criminal punishment which could be inflicted for the same activity.2T
Even granting that mere advocacy of forceful overthrow of the govern-
ment is a crime, resort to the conditioned privilege to punish these
criminals is repugnant to democratic principles of fairness and justice
since the government is thereby permitted to penalize without supporting
the burden of proof or adhering to the strict rules of the criminal
process, both of which would be required were the person prosecuted
under a criminal statute.
Restraints 'upon constitutional freedoms have not been limited to
those exercised for subversive purposes. For example, certain federal
employees are prohibited from participating in ordinary political activi-
ties. 28  The Supreme Court's opinion concerning the validity of these
restrictions was manifested in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.29 The
majority declared that regulating political participation of government
23. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-4111(a)(1) (1947); CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 1028
(1951); CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 18200 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. §876.05 (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. § 89.313 (Supp. 1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-306 (1949); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAws art. 85A, § 11 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 264, § 14 (Supp. 1952) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-112 (Supp. 1951); N.Y. CIVIL SERvicE LAW § 12a; Ore. Laws
1949, c. 311; WASI. REV. CODE § 9.81.060 (1952).
24. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1951); Ore. Laws 1949, c. 434, § 14.
25. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1404 (1947); ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-4113(c)
(1947); CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 18200 (1951) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1951); GA.
CODE ANN. § 89-313 (Supp. 1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-306 (1949); N.Y. CIVIL
SERvICE LAW § 12a; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 351.13 (Supp. 1952); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.81.060 (1952). For a compilation of state statutes aimed at the prevention of sup-
posed subversive activities, as of January 1, 1951, see GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 6.
26. For a discusion of these statutes, see GELLHORN, op. Cit. supra note 6.
27. It must be remembered that the loss of a job does not preclude criminal pun-
ishment as sanctioned by the criminal statutes for the proscribed activity.
28. 54 STAT. 767 (1940), 18 U.S.C. §61h (1946).
29. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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employees was valid when the prohibited activity was reasonably deemed
by Congress to impair the efficiency of the public service. Mr. Justice
Black dissented, however, believing that an employee of the government
has the same constitutional right as other citizens to take part in the
political processes by which elected representatives are chosen.
The United Public Workers rationale is inherent in later- decisions
dealing with the validity of loyalty oaths. In Steiner v. Darby, the Cali-
fornia court held that a government employee foregoes any right he may
have as a private citizen to advocate the forceful overthrow of the
government.30 Such a proposition might be sustained as a reasonable
measure to insure loyal and efficient government employees. The'court,
however, made more general and inclusive statements which could serve
as dangerous precedents for future tribunals, such as the declaration
that a person entering the public service impliedly relinquishes "certain
natural rights." In conclusion, the court declared that the oath did not
require the surrender of any constitutional rights, for government em-
ployees can still advocate and believe in overthrow of the government
after they leave the public employ. 3' Three years later, the Supreme
Court, in upholding a similar oath requirement, ignored the contention
that First Amendment rights were violated thereby.32
Even though the courts have permitted the imposition of conditions
upon public employment which, in effect, restrict basic rights, 33 they have
not allowed similar infringements upon religious freedom. In Morgan
30. 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948).
31. Certiorari was granted in 337 U.S. 929 (1949) and the case was dismissed
as not ripe for adjudication by the Supreme Court in 338 U.S. 327 (1949).
32. Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). In
addition, every employee was required to take an oath stating that within the previous
five years he had not been a member of a "subversive" organization. The petitioner
contended that the oath requirement violated due process in that it was not limited
to membership in organizations which the employee knew to be subversive. Mr. Justice
Clark for the majority assumed that the oath would not be interpreted as affecting
adversely those persons who during their membership in a proscribed association were
ignorant of its purpose. Id. at 723-24.
This assumption led to confusion the following year in Wrieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952). In this case the Court held unconstitutional a statute, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 37.1-37.8 (Supp. 1952), which required all state employees to
swear that they had not been members of an organization, classed as subversive by the
Attorney General, for a period of five years prior to the taking of the oath. Signifi-
cantly, it was Mr. Justice Clark who wrote for the Court. The majority felt the lack
of a requirement of scienter in the statute rendered it invalid. The opinion in the
Wieman case would seem to limit the application of loyalty qualifications upon gov-
ernment employment to activities performed and associations acquired knowingly and
wilfully.
33. While there has been this recent outbreak of legislation which conditions
government employment, such a practice was utilized as early as 1882 by the federal
government in Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Curtis had been imprisoned for
receiving money for political purposes from other government employees in contra-
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v. Civil Service Commission, the conditioning of the plaintiff's privilege
to secure a civil service position, solely upon religious convictions, was
held to be unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. 34  The New
Jersey court found that a condition of employment requiring a willing-
ness to salute the flag was actually a restraint of religious freedom as
applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. Rather than engage in the spurious
reasoning that the plaintiff could still worship as he pleased after resign-
ing from his job, the court recognized the compulsory characteristics
of a stipulation which forced the individual to choose between his job
and his religious beliefs.
In many instances, teachers are government employees, but the prob-
lems raised by the imposition of restrictions upon the teaching profession
are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate consideration. An effective
teacher cannot be an automaton who merely reiterates facts and policies
enumerated in approved writings, but must stimulate ideas through
unfettered, critical, and rational thought. Free speech and thought are
essential to productive teaching. The preservation of these freedoms in
academic processes is vital to the survival of a free civilization ;35 hence,
vention of a congressional statute. The Court felt that Congress' purpose in promot-
ing efficiency and integrity in official duties was within the legislative scope of authority
and the statute was a reasonable means toward that end. Ten years later, Judge Holmes
declared that a regulation making it a dismissable offense for members of a police
force to solicit money for any political purpose was a reasonable colidition, for no
one had a right to be a policeman. This opinion admits an individual has a right to
express himself on political matters, but the regulation does not prohibit such expres-
sion unless the person is a policeman. Since the city is not required to hire anyone
as a policeman, this is only a privilege upon which the city may impose any reasonable
conditions. McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.F_ 517(1892). Such logic has been used to uphold the dismissal of two San Francisco police-
men who refused to answer grand jury inquiries on the ground that their answer might
tend to incriminate them. The court offered the now familiar statement that the men
had a constitutional right to refuse to answer, but they had no right to be police
officers. Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d
416 (1939). The situation in the Christal case may be distinguished from cases involv-
ing First Amendment freedoms, for here it is the right against self-incrimination which
is involved. The question then is whether the Fifth Amendment prohibition applies
to the states through the implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According
to the authority of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), such a relation
does not exist per se. Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the circumstances of a particular
case violate fundamental freedoms in such a way as to be shocking to one's conscience.
Under this test, it is doubtful that the facts of the Christal case would be so heinous
to even an extremely sensitive mind as to be shocking. While it seems that this argu-
ment could have been maintained in the Christal case, it was not advanced, and the
decision was rested upon the ground that working for the city was a mere privilege
and, therefore, could be conditioned by requiring the surrender of the right against
self-incrimination.
34. 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A.2d 898 (1944). See note 45 infra.
35. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adler v. Board of Education of the City
NOTES
the application of the unconstitutional condition in this area 30 requires
consideration of factors not accorded emphasis in other contexts. Never-
theless, the language of the decisions mirrors the opinions already con-
sidered in the corporation and government employment areas.
In 1930, it was decided that there is no right to teach and, therefore,
the state can condition the privilege of teaching so as to prevent mem-
bership in a teacher's union. 37 But, in Tolman v. Underhill, a California
district court of appeals refused to uphold a statute which subjected
university professors to a loyalty oath as a condition of employment.
38
The court thought it inconceivable that the state constitution would
permit a test of political or religious belief, other than a pledge to
support the constitution, as a condition to becoming a teacher-such a
test would be repugnant to fundamental liberties and freedoms. 39 The
Supreme Court, however, in Adler v. Board of Education of the City of
New York, held constitutional a requirement that no person shall be
employed in the public school system who teaches or advocates overthrow
of the government. 40 Membership in an organization found to espouse
these prohibited philosophies is prima facie evidence of disqualification.
41
Mr. Justice ' Minton for the majority declared: "His freedom of choice
between membership in the organization and employment in the school
of New York, pointed out the undesirable aspects brought about by statutes like the
one in the instant case: "Teachers are under constant surveillance. . . .A pall is cast
over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that environment.
Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there
can be no exercise of the free intellect. Supineness and dogmatism take the place of
inquiry . . . .A problem can no longer be pursued with impunity to its edges ....
Instruction tends to become sterile; pursuit of knowledge is discouraged; discussion
often leaves off where it should begin." 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952).
On the other hand, an argument can be made that, because of the unique oppor-
tunity a communist would have as a teacher to disseminate subversive doctrines among
school-age children who may be incapable of evaluating the merit of these principles,
more rigid control is necessitated in this area than in any other. In addition, emotional
adherence to totalitarian ideology is inconsistent with a spirit of inquiry and with
objective thought.
36. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1404 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. § 89-313 (Supp. 1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-306 (1949); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWS art. 85A, § 13 (1951); N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:13-9.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949);
N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3022; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2908a (1948).
37. Seattle High School Chap. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 994
(1930).
38. 103 Cal. App.2d 348, 229 P.2d 447 (1951), aff'd on other grounds, 39 Cal.2d
708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
39. Ohio in a similar situation upheld the validity of such an oath after finding
there were no infringements upon any constitutionally protected rights. Dworken v.
Cleveland Board of Education, 42 0.0. 240, 94 N.E.2d 18 (1950).
40. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
41. N.Y. EDUCATIO.N LAW § 3022.
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system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly,
except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice."
42
Not only have conditions affecting constitutional guarantees been
imposed upon teachers, they have been levied upon the privilege of attend-
ing school. In the past, such restrictions have primarily affected religious
beliefs.43 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, how-
ever, seemed to mark an end to the state's power to grant the privilege of
attending school upon the performance of a condition which is repugnant
to individual religious convictions.44 While students' religious freedom
is apparently protected, 45 a recent Texas statute abridges freedom of
speech and thought by requiring students to swear to a non-communist
oath as a requisite to attending a state university or college.48 Louisiana
42. Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493
(1952).
43. Early cases upheld the constitutionality of requirements that school children
be vaccinated as a condition to their attending school. E.g., Blue v. Beach, 154 Ind.
101, 56 N.E. 89 (1900). In Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 Atl. 348 (1894), the
court recognized the requirement as being primarily an exercise of the police power.
Had the court stopped there, the opinion would have been sound; however, it went on
to rationalize that the condition did not compel vaccination, the requirement simply
called for vaccination as a condition of the privilege of attending school.
The next significant conditioning of school attendance occurred in connection with
Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at state universities. In Pearson v. Coale,
165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (1933), the Maryland court relied upon United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), which held that any special treatment given con-
scientious objectors is merely a congressionally granted privilege, not a right. There-
fore, by denying an individual his privilege of being a conscientious objector, the person
is not deprived of a constitutional right. Since the opportunity to attend school is also
merely a privilege, the denial of this opportunity abridges no fundamental liberties.
The following year, the Supreme Court was heard on this problem in Hamilton v.
University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). The Court held that the State of
California, not the federal government, gives the student the privilege of attending
the university; consequently, the student desiring to use the facilities the state benevo-
lently offers may be requ:red to do so upon the terms the state imposes.
44. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Barnette case specifically overruled Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, 301 U.S. 586 (1940), which sanctioned such practices. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter dissented feeling that the Court could find a "rational basis" in
West Virginia's action, and the regulation should be allowed.
One commentator has pointed out that the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), utilizes the "rational basis"
for testing state legislation which is attacked as violative of the First Amendment-
Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1951-52, 20 U. of CmI. L. REV. 1, 27 (1952).
At page 28 Frank concludes that in the light of the Beauharnais case the "rational
basis" test has been adopted by a majority of the Court and "perhaps the flag salute
will again have a turn at being valid if it comes back again."
45. The rationale of the Barnette case was accepted the following year in the
area of governmental employ by the New Jersey court in Morgan v. Civil Service Com-
mission, 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A.2d 898 (1944), which insisted that "the treasured ...
religious liberties yield only to grave public exigencies." Id. at 417, 36 A.2d at 902.
46. Part of this oath reads: "I swear ... that I am not and have not during
the past two (2) years been a member of or affiliated with any society . . . which
teaches . . . that the government . . . should be overthrown. , , , by . . . unlawful
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has a similar law, minus the oath stipulation, which results in the
same infringements of fundamental rights.
47
While a layman might be persuaded that the Constitution does not
protect his opportunity to attend or teach school, or to hold a government
job, it would be an almost insurmountable task to prove to him that his
privilege of voting was not constitutionally guaranteed. Yet, the exercise
of the elective franchise has been consistently regarded as a mere political
privilege.48  And, with the thesis firmly established that there is no
right to vote, it was a small step to the declaration that the establishment
of political parties49 and the privilege of running for a public office"°
means . . . ... TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 2908(b) (Supp. 1950). As yet, there has
been no litigation under this statute.
47. ". . . no student in a public educational institution, shall by word of mouth
or writing knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach, the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety, of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United
States . . . by force, violence, or any other unlawful means. . . ." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42:54-42:55 (Supp. 1952). Any student found guilty of violating this prohi-
bition shall be expelled from school. Id. at § 42:56.
48. As early as 1865 it was felt that the exercise of the elective franchise could
be conditioned upon the taking of a test oath prescribed by a state constitution, for
it is an absolute, unqualified right of the state to regulate the elective machinery. Ander-
son v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865). Two years later, it was held that voting is a mere
privilege which can be offered or refused, expanded or contracted, either with or
without reason. Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 119 (1867). See STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION C. IX, § 582 (4th ed. 1873).
In addition to imposing the taking of a loyalty oath upon the privilege of voting,
state statutes conditioning this privilege upon the paying of a poll tax, Breedlove v_
Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), and upon the taking of an oath that the deponent is
not and has not been a polygamist, Shepherd v. Grimmett, 13 Idaho 403, 31 Pac. 793
(1892), have been upheld.
49. A 1940 decision upheld an Arkansas statute, Aai. STAT. ANN. § 3-1604 (1947),
which specifically barred any party from the ballot which advocated the overthrow
of the government by force. Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W.2d 567 (1940). It
was stated that the act did not prevent the Communist Party or any other group from
advocating overthrow of the government, it simply denied them the political privilege
of having their name on the ballots. The court believed that there could be no doubt
the state could condition the creation, existence, and operation of political parties.
A similar, but distinguishable, situation occurred in Communist Party of America
v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942). The California statute disqualified a
party from the ballot: (1) if it used the word "Communist" as a party designation;
(2) if it directly or indirectly was affiliated with the Communist Party or a party
which advocates the forceful overthrow of the government; or (3) if it could not
prove 2,500 voters had declared their intention to affiliate with the party-this proof
had to be in the hands of the Secretary of State twenty five days prior to the last
primary. CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 2540.3-2540.5 (1945). The California Constitution guar-
antees the privilege of voting to all persons who can qualify under the requirements
contained in that document. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11. The legislature, then, can
only impose reasonable and non-arbitrary conditions upon voting. judged by these
standards, the statute was declared unconstitutional. It is noteworthy that the Cali-
fornia court considered the opportunity to vote as one of the highest privileges of a
citizen since it is one of the fundamental attributes of a republican form of government.
50. The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion found no constitutional rights
were violated by a Maryland act, MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 85A, § 1-5 (1951),
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stood in no greater stead."
While the most questionable and extensive use of the unconstitu-
tional condition has occurred in the four areas treated, the principle has
arisen in other fields and the fact that its use has been less frequent
makes it no more defensible. Labor unions, protesting the non-communist
affidavit section of the Labor Management Relations Act,52 have met
the same arguments with which teachers and students, voters, govern-
ment employees, and corporations have long been acquainted. 53
The legislatures and the courts have seemingly found no limitations,
as yet, to the unconstitutional condition's applicability. The granting of
a driver's license has been conditioned upon the applicant's waiver of his
right against self-incrimination.54 The privilege of receiving unemploy-
ment compensation in Ohio will not be granted to anyone who advocates
violent overthrow of the government. 55 The issuance of passports has
requiring every candidate for political office to file a loyalty affidavit as a prerequisite
to having his name on the ballot. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of
Baltimore, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). See Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332 (1950); State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 228 (1867).
51. A valid argument can be asserted that the Constitution, through the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, forbids such state action which disqualifies voters on the
basis of race, color, previous condition of servitude, or sex. On this point, Mr. Justice
Douglas has offered the most rational standard. Regardless of the express wording
of the statute, should the act deprive a citizen of his privilege of voting because of
arbitrary standards beyond the individual's control, the statute would violate the Con-
stitution. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 289 (1948).
52. "No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting com-
merce concerning the representation of employees . . . unless there is on file with the
Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such labor organization and the
officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate
* . . that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party,
and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that
believes in or teaches the overthrow of the . . . Government by . . . unconstitutional
methods. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952).
53. In National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F.Supp. 146 (D.D.C.
1948), the court maintained that the position of an exclusive bargaining agent is a
privilege existing only by congressional sanction and, therefore, can be conditioned by
Congress. Judge Prettyman dissented, feeling that the requirement of an affidavit forces
the union leaders to waive their constitutional rights under the First Amendment, for
the non-communist oath section is not merely a condition upon a privilege, it is an
infringement of the union leader's freedom of thought.
54. Woods v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129 (1916); People v. Finley, 27
Cal. App. 291, 149 Pac. 779 (1915) ; Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140 (1935) ;
State v. Sterrin, 78 N.H. 220, 98 Ati..482 (1916) ; People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y.
115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
55. Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (1950). Pennsylvania
also has a statute which denies state assistance to any person who advocates or belongs
to any organization advocating the forceful overthrow of the government. Aged persons
are included within this prohibition; however, blind persons are excepted. The rationale
of this exception is not given. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2509 (Cum. Supp. 1952). On
a collateral point, see United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.Wis. 1942)
and United States v. Hautau, 43 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1942) which were concemred
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been denied apparently because of the applicant's political views or asso-
ciations.5" Professional men, too, have felt the sting of the doctrine, for
some of the earliest and latest cases have affected them. 7 A recent
imposition of an unconstitutional condition denies the privilege of obtain-
ing low-cost government housing to anyone belonging to an organization
listed as subversive by the Attorney General.58 At the present time, then,
with the conditioning of employment with the W.P.A. on not being a communist or a
member of a Nazi bund.
56. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional problems raised by such
a practice, see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952). A district court has held that revocation
of a passport without fair notice and hearing violates the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Constitution. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
57. One of the earliest cases concerning attorneys was Ex parte Hunter, 2 W.Va.
122 (1867), a case which involved the constitutionality of a loyalty oath which required
all lawyers to aver that they did not bear arms against the United States during the
Civil War. The Supreme Court of West Virginia declared the opportunity to practice
law was a special privilege; therefore, the qualifications and fitness of applicants could
be absolutely determined by the state and made to depend upon the meeting of any
condition precedent.
In the same year, the United States Supreme Court decided the validity of a test
oath, similar to the one in the Hunter case, imposed upon priests, among others, by
the Missouri Constitution. The Court felt the disability imposed by the constitution
was a penalty for the commission of an act which was not a crime when it was com-
mitted, and, therefore, violated the constitutional guarantee against ex post facto laws.
Cumming v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867). The same day the Court struck down
a like federal statute which conditioned the admission of an attorney to the bar of
the Supreme Court upon the taking of a loyalty oath. Mr. Justice Miller in dissenting,
however, believed the practice of law is a privilege which the state may grant upon
the grantee's acceptance of limitations or conditions prescribed by the grantor. Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867). The holding in the Hunter case and the dicta
in the Cummings and Garland cases establishing that the retention of a professional
position was a mere privilege have been consistently followed for nearly a hundred
years. E.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Brents v. Stone, 60 F. Supp.
82 (E.D.Ill. 1945) ; Application of Cassidy, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944). The last Supreme
Court decision in this area was handed down in It re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945),
in which the Court upheld the validity of a requirement that each applicant for admis-
sion to the Illinois bar take an oath to support the constitution of the State of Illinois.
The petitioner maintained that since the constitution contained a section requiring armed
defense of the state, ILL. CONST. Art. XII, the petitioner as a conscientious objector
was denied the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The majority, finding no discriminatory purpose in this section, rejected this
contention. The Court reasoned that since a resident alien can be barred from naturali-
zation because he is a conscientious objector, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931), refusal of admission to the bar on the same grounds cannot violate the
Constitution. One year after this case, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S 61 (1946),
was handed down. This decision held that a resident alien conscientious objector could
not be barred from national citizenship if he would agree to perform non-combatant
duties in the armed forces. The Girouard decision casts doubt upon the authority of
the Summers case and highlights Mr. Justice Black's dissent in the latter case. Mr.
Justice Black did not believe that a man who was qualified in every respect could be
barred from practicing law solely because he was a conscientious objector.
58. The Gwinn Amendment to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of
1952, 66 STAT. 403 (1952), 42 U.S.C. § 1411b (Supp. 1952), provides: ". . . That no
housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937 . .. shall be
occupied by a person who is a member of an organization designated as subversive
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it is difficult to find an area of government activity which would not
lend itself to utilization of the requirement that one forego a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right as a condition to participation. The applicability
of the unconstitutional condition as a circuitous method of destroying
rights by conditioning privileges is unlimited when nearly all government
activities may be termed privileges so far as public participation is con-
cerned.59
With almost unbroken regularity the validity of statutes imposing
conditions upon the enjoyment of a governmental privilege has been
by the Attorney General: Provided further, That the foregoing prohibition shall be
enforced by the local housing authority .... ." To give force to the latter part of
this amendment, the Housing Authority of Newark, New Jersey, has required its
tenants to sign an affidavit as a condition to their remaining in government housing
that neither they nor any person living in the housing with them is a member of one
of the subversive organizations listed by the Attorney General. The validity of this
regulation is presently being contested in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division-Essex County, in the case of Lawrence v. Housing Authority of the City
of Newark. Plaintiff's contentions, among others, are that the Gwinn Amendment
restricts speech and association, violates due process in that it bears no reasonable rela-
tion to the public welfare, constitutes a bill of attainder, and is an unconstitutional
condition upon a privilege. The defendant insisted that in accordance with the terms
of the lease, under which the housing was rented, the agreement could be terminated
by either party and without reason upon thirty days notice. It is the Housing Author-
ity's contention that it merely exercised this option and, therefore, the constitutionality
of the Gwinn Amendment is in no way involved. On March 24, 1953, the court issued
a temporary injunction in the Lawrence case to prevent the eviction of the plaintiffs
irom their housing until a determination could be made whether or not the threatened
eviction was occasioned by the plaintiff's failure to sign the affidavit.
Other cases attempting to test the constitutionality of the Gwinn Amendment are
Hankerson v. Housing Authority, No. 609741, Superior Court, County of Los Angeles,
and Fitch v. Chicago Housing Authority. Should these courts refuse to recognize that
the implementation of the amendment infringes upon constitutionally guaranteed rights,
the plaintiffs in these cases will be forced to choose between the surrender of their
right to free thought, speech, and association, and their homes. Thus, they may be
added to the long list of persons who have been required to make such impossible
choices in many other diverse situations.
Part of the material presented in this footnote was taken from communications
to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Mr. Herbert Monte Levy of the American Civil
Liberties Union, one of the counsels for the plaintiffs in Lawrence v. Housing Author-
ity of the City of Newark.
59. Manifestly, then, the unconstitutional condition may be imposed upon privileges
which affect great numbers of American citizens so as to deprive them of fundamental
liberties.
The Hatch Act, 54 STAT. 767 (1940), 18 U.S.C. §§ 61-61x (1946), has denied the
privilege of participating in political activities to 2,603,288 federal government employees.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 91 (1953). Were the loyalty oath require-
ments for teachers and the conditions imposed upon school attendance, which have
been discussed, made uniform, 913,671 public school teachers, Id. at 566, and approxi-
mately 30,500,000 students would be forced to forego certain of their rights in order
to comply with the requirements. Id. at 368. Since there are an estimated 62,200,000
automobile drivers in the nation, this large group of persons could be forced to sur-
render their right against self-incrimination as payment for the privilege of driving
a ca.Id. at 473. If every state had- adopted Ohio's unemployment compensation laws,
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challenged upon three main grounds: (1) ex post facto; (2) bill of
attainder; and (3) due process. With the same consistency that these
arguments have been presented, the courts have rejected them.
The ex post facto 0 contention has been unsuccessful since courts
have rarely held that the deprivation of the privileges of working for
the government, voting, teaching and attending school, or practicing
law constitutes the punishment contemplated by the ex post facto inter-
dict. 1
A bill of attainder has been succinctly defined by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter as "the substitution of legislative determination of guilt and legis-
lative imposition of punishment for judicial finding and sentence."0 2 The
courts, in overcoming the contention that statutes which condition the
grant of a governmental privilege are bills of attainder," rationalize that
these statutes carry no penalty for non-compliance; they simply withhold
a privilege which the state is not obligated to grant and the denial of a
government privilege is not punishment. 4 But, in United States v.
Lovett,"5 the Supreme Court, relying upon the authority of Cummings v.
Missouri,00 found a legislative act which in effect barred three named
individuals from governmental employ to be punishment without judicial
process. The Lovett case cannot be reconciled with the numerous decisions
approximately 3,900,000 citizens would have been affected in 1950. 1951 INFORmATIoN
PLEASE ALMANAC 291. There are approximately 1,040,000 state employees in the United
States who would be subject to the loyalty oath requirements for government jobs,
THE Boor, OF THE STATES 186 (1952-53), as well as approximately 3,030,000 local gov-
ernment employees. Id. at 181.
60. An ex post facto law operates in retrospect to punish as a criminal offense
an act which was not a crime when it was committed. See Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867); United States ex rel. Forino v. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 846,849 (W.D.Pa. 1947); Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 438, 32 P.2d 18, 24 (1934).
61. It was early decided that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution was
restricted in its force to criminal penalties. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U.S. 1796).
62. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321-22 (1945) (dissent).
63. At common law the bill of attainder was a special act declaring an individual
to be guilty of a crime and to be punished by deprivation of his vested rights without
utilization of the judicial process. Consequently, a statute is not a bill of attainderif the offense is not specified and a judgment of guilt is not made. Nor can an actbe struck down as a bill of attainder if it inflicts no punishment. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LImITATIONS 536 (8th ed. 1927).
64. E.g., Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485(1952) ; Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Dent v. WestVirginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog,
78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1948); Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429(1948); McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517(1892); Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 42 0.0. 240, 94 N.E.2d 18 (1950) ;Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (1950); State v. Armstrong,
39 Wash.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
65. 328 U.S. 303 (1945).
66. 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
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which hold that denial of a government job is not punishment.6 7 And, in
the light of more recent Supreme Court opinions,6 the authority of the
Lovett holding seems to be limited to legislation which names specific
individuals and expressly declares that those persons are to be barred
from holding government jobs. Such statutes are rare, however, so that
the bill of attainder objection is not likely to meet with success.
The term "privilege" is extensively used as an escape for courts
confronted with the argument that the condition deprives a person of
liberty or property in contravention of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment. A long line of cases gives authority to the proposition that there
is no property right in a government job because a public employee has
no right to remain in his position.6 9 Further, there is a lack of authority
for including within the meaning of liberty any interest an employee may
have in his job.
When the statute is, attacked as being violative of the First Amend-
ment, the courts look only to the explicit wording of the act. None of
these statutes specifically prohibits the exercise of the rights of free
speech, assembly, or religion. In the few cases in which a court has
67. See note 64 supra.
68. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). In the
Douds case, the petitioners raised the bill of attainder argument and cited United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), as controlling. The Court answered this contention
in the following language: "But there is a decisive distinction: in the previous decisions
the individuals involved were in fact punished for past actions; whereas in this case they
are subject to possible loss of position only because there is a substantial ground for the
congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future
conduct. Of course, the history of the past conduct is the foundation for the judg-
ment as to what the future conduct is likely to be; but that does not alter the con-
clusion that § 9,(h) is intended to prevent future action rather than to punish past
action." Id. at 413-14.
Petitioners in Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716(1951), also relied heavily upon the Lovett case. At 723, however, the Court said:
"Unlike the provisions of the Charter and ordinance under which the petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualifications and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by
its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensation to named individual
employees. Under these circumstances viewed against the legislative background, the
statute was held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial."
69. E.g., Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910); Taylor v. Beckham,
178 U.S. 548 (1900); Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Wetzel v. McNutt, 4
F. Supp 233 (S.D. Ind. 1933); Edge v. Holcomb, 135 Ga. 765, 70 S.E. 644 (1911);
State v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 Pac. 795 (1905). Contra: Ekern v. McGovern, 154
Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913). ". . . [Clan it be possible it was thought the terms
'liberty' and 'property' would not include more than freedom from unjust physical
restrictions and things subject to be bought and sold, or stop short of freedom for
one to possess anything and to enjoy it as property, if valuable in any sense, which may
lawfully administer to his reputable desires and happiness? . .. I think it is dealing with
technicalities to restrict 'property' so as to exclude the right to an office . . . acquired,
perhaps, by years of effort in preparation for its duties, and by legitimate expenditures
of money." Id. at 254, 142 N.W. at 624.
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recognized that constitutional rights may be involved, defenders of gov-
ernmental encroachment upon First Amendment freedoms have con-
tended successfully that constitutional rights are not deprived by a condi-
tioned privilege statute because one need only forego the privilege to
retain his rights. Superficially, this argument has merit. Realistically,
it is subject to strong criticism. Admitting that there may be no recognized
right to teach or attend school, to vote, to hold a government position,
to practice law, to drive a car, to live in government housing, to receive
unemployment compensation, to be issued a passport, or to use the
machinery of the Labor Management Relations Act, certain of these
privileges have become such an important part of American life that
they should not be arbitrarily denied. Further, a person should not be
required to choose between exercising constitutional rights and securing
an imperative economic, social, or political necessity.
To a foreign correspondent, a passport is essential to the task for
which he has spent quantities of time and money training himself to
perform. 70 Low-cost government housing and unemployment compen-
sation may be necessary to the survival of an indigent or unemployed
worker. Just as use of and access to the postal system has assumed
the proportions of a right, so the privileges enumerated above could
feasibly be considered in the same light."'
When the privilege of attending a university is conditioned upon
enrollment in military science courses, the prospective student who is a
conscientious objector is confronted with an impossible choice. Should
he accept the privilege, he must foresake his religious convictions which
prohibit his participation in, or preparation for, war. Should he remain
faithful to his religion, he must sacrifice the economic, social, and intel-
lectual values of a higher education. If he is financially unable to attend
a university other than a state supported institution, he is effectively
denied the opportunity to receive the benefits of an education solely
because of his religious beliefs. Under these circumstances, it cannot
be defensibly maintained that the condition does not abridge a conscien-
tious objector's freedom of religion, for the very exercise of that free-
dom forces him to forego an education. Certainly, it was not the inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution to guarantee freedom of religion
in the abstract. Deprivation of educational opportunities because of
one's religious convictions is just as much a penalty as a prohibition
against the belief itself.72
70. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). See Note, 61 YALE L.
J. 171 (1952).
71. See note 73 infra.
72. In addition to abridging an individual's right to worship as he believes, such
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When an oath or affidavit is required as a condition to obtaining or
keeping a government job, the applicant or employee may be forced to
surrender his rights to freedom of speech and thought if he wishes to
secure or maintain the position. It is no help to say that the individual's
fundamental rights have not been abridged because he has only been
required to sacrifice the enjoyment of a privilege which could have
been completely denied to him. In relation to a person who is applying
for a government job as a truck driver, failure to take the oath may
have no serious effect on his opportunity to earn a living, for he probably
will be able to obtain private employment. The same cannot be said for
career government workers. As to these people, failure to secure a gov-
ernment job may mean that their very source of livelihood is denied to
them because of their thoughts and speech. The real effect of the condi-
tion upon these people is to compel them to choose between their right
to think and speak freely and their economic well-being. They cannot
exercise their First Amendment freedoms unless they sacrifice a position
which might be economically necessary to their existence. In this situa-
tion, the condition is as effective a deterrent to thought and speech as
direct prohibition would be. Thus considered, it is apparent that one
does not voluntarily waive his right-he has been coerced because of the
basic importance of the privileges involved to his economic, social, and
personal well-being. 73 Even a brief consideration of the many activities
a condition violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
effect, the conscientious objector is being denied entry to a university solely because
of his religious beliefs. Discrimination of this sort has been proscribed when the
denial of the privilege was based entirely upon the individual's color. State ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Certainly, it is arguable that religious belief
is of no lesser importance.
73. Upon the basis that a privilege is, in some circumstances, tantamount to a
right, it then may be advanced that its deprivation constitutes a violation of the due
process guarantee of life, liberty, and property. The proposition that a privilege can
achieve the status of a right through necessity and tradition is not new, for it has
been proffered and accepted in regard to the postal service. Originally, the mail service
was established voluntarily by the government-a privilege; however, today it is the
primary instrumentality for the operation of commercial, social, and personal trans-
actions. "It would be going a long way . . . to say that in the management of the
Post Office the people have no definite rights reserved by the First and Fifth Amend-
ments of the Constitution. . . " Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C.Cir. 1941).
See Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1945); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138,
141 (1922) (dissent). Mr. Justice Bradley maintained in his dissent to Ex parte
Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882), that the right to hold office is a fundamental right. Also,
see Mr. Justice Black's dissent in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947).
Another privilege which has become a fundamental ingredient of a republican form
of government is the opportunity to vote. Free people consider the privilege of voting
for whom one chooses to be one of the basic differences between a democratic society
and the totalitarian systems of communism and fascism. It is understandable. then,
that voting has assumed constitutionally protected heights in the eyes of the citizen.
Just as voting has become vitally important to the American citizen, so has the oppor-
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which have been foreclosed through surrender of constitutional rights
as a prerequisite to entry therein serves to buttress this conclusion.
In the face of the above considerations, it is not clear why the courts
have refused to look through the privilege fiction and admit that in many
instances these direct limitations upon privileges operate as indirect
restrictions upon rights. Progress, however, has been made by the
Supreme Court in casting doubt upon the doctrine's validity. The Court
in American Communications Ass"n v. Douds,7 4 after balancing the right
of Congress to protect the free flow of commerce from obstruction due
to political strikes against the right of the individual to free speech and
association, felt the former outweighed the latter. While the result of
the weighing process is questionable,7" the grounds upon which the deci-
sion was based are commendable. The privilege fiction was specifically
rejected and the decision was rested upon a balancing of two rights to
determine which demanded greater protection under the circumstances.76
That certain statutes do infringe upon basic liberties has been recognized
in three other recent Supreme Court cases ;7  however, except for the
Douds opinion, the decisions have not completely discarded the privilege
tunity to form a new political party should a group of the electorate be dissatisfied with
the present parties. It is obvious that the exercise of the elective franchise is worthless
if there is only one party or one person for whom to vote. Such a situation would
make a complete mockery out of the claim that our government is a representative one.
74. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
75. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, and Evils That Congress Has a
Right to Prevent, 26 IND. L. J. 477 (1951).
76. "In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of the
statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the con-
gressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substan-
tial harm to interstate commorce ... " American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950).
77. See Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485
(1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
One writer has maintained that ". . . no vitality remains in Holmes' dictum . . .
that the state can curtail the activities of its employees because they have no 'right'
to their jobs." Fraenkel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IowA L. REV. 153, 163 (1952). This
conclusion was drawn primarily from the opinion of the Court in American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). This deduction seems to be premature
in the light of the Garner case, supra, which upheld the curtailment of the petitioner's
activity with certain associations while he remained an employee of the city. Should
teachers in public schools be considered as government employees, the Adler case, supra,
further rebuts the inference that Holmes' dictum has become impotent. Fraenkel
mentioned that probable jurisdiction had been noted in the Adler case but argument
had not been heard when his article was written. Fraenkel, supra at 169. In the Adler
case at 492 the Court said: "It is equally clear that they have no right to work for
the State in the school system on their own terms. They may work for the school
system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York."
The reasonable terms which the Court upheld in this case curtailed New York
teachers' associations and activities with certain enumerated organizations. Mr. Fraenkel
represented the appellant in the Adler case.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
conception, and, until they do, lower court deliberations will remain
mired in the irrational privilege argument while constitutional rights are
conditioned out of existence."'
Admittedly, with many of these statutes the federal and state govern-
ments are striving to protect a vital interest of the sovereign. When the
state requires all school teachers to take a loyalty oath, it is attempting
to protect the minds of its school-age children from the real or supposed
threat of indoctrination with communist propaganda. 79 A modification
of this danger provides the impetus for requiring a loyalty oath from
government employees.80 When the state requires an automobile operator
to waive his right against self-incrimination by giving his name and
other information to an authorized person after he has been involved
in an accident, the government is trying to safeguard its citizens from
the dangers incident to the volume of vehicular traffic."' In conditioning
a student's attendance in school upon his being vaccinated or x-rayed,
the sovereign hopes to prevent epidemics of small-pox and tuberculosis.8 2
Obviously, the government believes the interest to be protected is suffi-
ciently vital to warrant the action taken. On the other hand, the citizen
has an important individual interest at stake-his rights are involved.
Since the conflict is clear, it is difficult to understand why many of the
forums dodge the issue and decide the controversy upon the fictional
privilege basis.83 Much less confusion, bad law, and poor precedent
would result from the adoption of a straight-forward approach.
78. The Court's refusal to look beyond the express wording of the statute to
its effect is particularly difficult to reconcile with the Civil Rights cases. The so-called
"grandfather clause" which prevented an individual from voting unless his grandfather
had voted was recognized immediately as an unjust discrimination against Negroes.
The section did not explicitedly prohibit Negroes from voting; this result was only
the effect of the statute's operation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the clause
unconstitutional. "It is true it [1910 amendment to OxLA. CONST. arts. 3] contains no
express words of exclusion . . . of any person on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude . . . but the standard itself inherently brings that result into
existence.... ." Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1915). There is no rational
explanation for judicial failure to recognize that the statutes under discussion invade
basic freedoms when such is the practical effect of the legislation.
79. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Board of Education of
the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Tolman v. Underhill, 103 Cal. App.2d
348, 229 P.2d 447 (1951); Throp v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Industrial
Education of Newark, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951); Dworken v. Cleveland Board
of Education, 42 0.0. 240, 94 N.E.2d 18 (1950). See note 35 supra.
80. See notes 23, 24, and 25 supra.
81. See note 54 supra.
82. Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 Atl. 348 (1894); Blue v. Beach, 154 Ind.
101, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) ; State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.2d 860 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
83. E.g., Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U.S.
56 (1951) ; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) ; Hamilton v. University of California,
293 U.S. 245 (1934); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882); Field v. Hall, 201 Ark.
77, 143 S.W.2d 567 (1940) ; Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948) ;
NOTES
Should the Court reject the privilege fiction in these areas, it would
not be without justifiable grounds upon which to uphold the constitu-
tionality of some of the questioned regulations. It is generally under-
stood and accepted that the rights of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution are not absolute.84 The right of the state to enact laws for
the preservation of public health, safety, or morals has been recognized
as a necessary power of government.8 5 If a statute represents proper
exercise of the police power, it cannot be invalidated because individual
rights are abridged by its operation. 6 In the Adler "case" and in Throp
z. Board of Trustees of School for Industrial Education of Newark,88
the courts spoke of the police power and intimated that the action taken
might be within that power.8 9 In these cases the courts undertook a
balancing process between the interests involved. Looking only to the
statutory language and the direct effect of the wording, the courts
Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (1950); EX parte Hunter, 2
W.Va. 122 (1867).
84. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
394-95 (1950); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ;
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474-75 (1920) ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp.
445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
85. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949); Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53,
55 (1916); Lake Shore & M.R.R v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 688 (1899); United States
v. Delaware & H. Co., 164 Fed. 215, 233 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1908); Walton v. City of
Atlanta, 89 F. Supp. 309, 312-14 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Suppus v. Bradley, 101 N.Y.S.2d
557,564 (1950); Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St.. 313, 328, 71 N.E.2d
246, 253 (1947); Creditor's Service Corp. v. Cumming, 57 R.I. 291, 300, 190 Atl.
2, 8 (1937); Ex parte George, 152 Tex. Cr. 465, 469, 215 S.W.2d 170, 172 (1948);
Stickley v. Givens, 176 Va. 548, 557, 11 S.E.2d 631, 636 (1941).
86. It is a power growing out of necessity and must be used only when there
is a great and immediate danger to the public welfare which must be met. Further,
the regulations imposed and the restrictions sanctioned must bear a reasonable connec-
tion to the end sought. See Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 365 (C.C.D.Kan. 1909); Town
of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetary, 70 Ill. 191 (1873); City of Louisville v. Kuhn,
284 Ky. 684, 145 S.W.2d 851 (1940); State v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N.W. 633(1899).
87. Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
88. 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
this case and in a per curiam opinion vacated the judgment feeling that the question
had become moot. 342 U.S. 803 (1951).
89. "His freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employ-
ment in the school system might be limited. . . . Certainly such limitation is not
one the state may not make in the exercise of its-police power to protect the schools
from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence." Adler v. Board of Education
of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
"Government has the inherent right of self protection against the forces that
would accomplish its overthrow by violence. It is of the very nature of the social
compact that the individual freedoms at issue here are subject to reasonable restraint
in the service of an interest deemed essential to the life of the community." Throp
v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Industrial Education of Newark, 6 N.J. 498,
508, 79 A.2d 462, 467 (1951).
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weighed the privilege of teaching school against the right of the com-
munity to protect itself and then decided that the latter outweighed the
former. The result might have been different had the courts balanced
the rights of free speech and thought against the state's action.
Certain situations seem to be well within the authority of the police
power. The regulations conditioning the attendance of a student in a
public school or university upon vaccination or x-ray examination are
reasonable means of.protecting the health of all citizens. It is common
knowledge that the death toll upon highways necessitates strict control
of owners and operators of automobiles if this danger to the general
public is to be minimized. The apprehension of drivers involved in acci-
dents so that disciplinary measures might be instituted against them is
a plausible means of controlling a dangerous activity. The police power
is uniquely suited to such applications. Had the opinions which upheld
these restrictions upon fundamental rights relied upon the police power
as the source of authority which permitted such action, the decisions
would have been made upon sound grounds. Precedents susceptible to
undesirable future extension to completely different situations would
then have been avoided.
While there is no specific police power in the United States gov-
ernment, the commerce clause of the Constitution has been interpreted
to allow federal action of the same type permitted under the state's
police power.90 In addition to the commerce power, Congress has the
right and the duty to promote efficiency and to insure integrity and
discipline in the public service."- If political partisanship among gov-
ernmental employees could reasonably be thought seriously to obstruct
the proper functioning of the governmental machinery to the detriment
of the general public, such partisanship should be eliminated. Similarly
should a "clear and present danger" be proved to exist in having per-
sons who believe in violent overthrow of the government employed in
governmental positions, the vital interest of the sovereign in self-pro-
tection 2 should furnish the authority with which to prohibit such per-
sons from holding these positions.
90. E.g., United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938);
Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414 (1926). See RoTrsciAaxFR, CO,'STIrTrONAL
LAW c. 8 (1939).
91. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Ex parte
Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.Cir. 1950), aff'd
inem., 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
92. E.g., Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485
(1952) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Anderson v.
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Many of the cases, then, which have utilized the privilege doctrine
to uphold the constitutionality of unconstitutional conditions could have
been sustained as a valid exercise of the police power or some other
accepted sovereign authority. There are other cases, however, which
appear to be outside the scope of any of these powers. The courts have
so held in Morgan v. Civil Service Comnission,93 Tolvan v. Under-
hill, 4 and Communist Party of America v. Peek.95 In other cases,
too, had the familiar considerations incident to a valid exercise of the
police power been applied, the statutes would not have met the require-
ments demanded by this authority and should have been declared uncon-
stitutional.9 6
When called upon to decide the validity of a condition imposed
upon a governmental privilege, the courts have a threefold duty to per-
form: (1) They should investigate the indirect as well as the direct
effect of the statute's operation to discover whether or not it restrains
the exercise of any constitutional rights. (2) If such rights are affected,
the nature of the sovereign's interest under which the legislation was
enacted should be examined. (3) If the relevant state power is a
recognized right of the government, the courts should weigh the rights
involved to determine which should receive the greater protection under
the circumstances. Factually, if First Amendment freedoms are con-
cerned, the state should be required to prove that a "clear and present
danger" exists from an evil the state has a right to prevent. A "rational
basis" test for legislation regarding First Amendment rights ignores
to an alarming degree the factual justification which should support
restrictions upon speech and thought.
It must be borne in mind that the conditions which have been im-
posed with reference to communism and overthrow of the government
are but one segnment of the general problem of unconstitutional con-
ditions. While the communist threat may pass in time, the precedent
of the cases herein discussed will remain to influence future tribunals.97
Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865); Throp v. Board of Trustees of School for Industrial
Education of Newark, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951).
93. 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A.2d 898 (1944).
94. 103 Cal. App.2d 348, 229 P.2d 447 (1951), aff'd on other grounds, 39 Cal.2d
708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
95. 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942).
96. E.g., It re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Hamilton v. University of Cali-
fornia, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143, S.W.2d 567 (1940).
97. Mr. Justice Black has said: "Public opinion being what it now is, few will
protest the conviction of . . . Communist[s]. . . . There is hope, however, that in
calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later
Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where
they belong in a free society." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951)
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The language of the decisions will indicate to coming generations of
legislators and judges that if a particular activity can be classified as
a privilege, it can be conditioned. The statute's indirect effect will con-
tinue to be subordinated to its express wording and constitutional rights
will be constantly placed in jeopardy. Should the courts continue their
present course, any right may be abolished by the circuitous method
of conditioning some necessary privilege upon its surrender. This dan-
ger becomes more acute with the realization that the courts consider
rights to be only those enumerated in the Constitution; everything else,
no matter how essential to the individual's economic, social, or personal
well-being, is a privilege which can be conditioned. Not until the issue
is recognized for what it is-the basic freedoms of the individual bal-
anced against the interests of the state-will the mandates of the Con-
stitution be properly considered in judicial scrutiny of legislative action
against real or supposed threats from unpopular minority groups.98
AN ANALYSIS OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL
LEGISLATION
Preoccupation with the amazingly rapid expansion of suburban
areas, 1 usually achieved through the process of large-scale subdivid-
ing,2 may easily obscure perception of the haphazard manner of the
typical city's movement to its outer limits. The most unfortunate aspect
of such uncontrolled growth is the failure to realize its detrimental
affect upon the health, safety, and economic well-being of the com-
munity.
(dissent). First Amendment liberties should occupy their "preferred place," not
only in calm times, but especially in times of crisis and peril.
98. When it is granted tat many direct conditions imposed upon governmental
privileges operate as indirect abridgements of recognized constitutional rights, and,
further, that many activities which bear the courts' label of privilege are, in reality,
so important to the individual as to assume the status of a right, grave doubts must
be cast upon the constitutional validity of the current procedures being employed
against undesirable groups. See SHARP, The Old Constitution, 20 U. OF CnI. L. R.,
529, 534-44 (1953).
1. For a discussion of the post-war construction boom, see Fortune, June 1950,
p. 67, col. 1. The results of the 1950 census show that the greatest increase in popula-
tion in the past decade occurred in suburbs of metropolitan areas. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, POPULATION OF URBANIZED AREAS (DEPT. CommERcE P-C-3, No. 2, 1950).
2. Subdividing is usually defined as division of a parcel of land into a specified
number of lots for the purpose of sale or building. See notes 99-102 infra and accom-
panying text. See also Appendix, p. 574, col. 11 infra.
